POLLUTION CONTROL HEARINGS BOARD STATE OF WASHINGTON

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2 EMMA DIXON, GERALD FARRIS, and 3 SNO-KING ENVIRONMENTAL ALLIANCE, 4 Appellants, PCHB NOS. 05-030, 05-059 5 v. 6 STATE OF WASHINGTON, ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY DEPARTMENT OF ECOLOGY and KING **JUDGMENT** 7 COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL 8 RESOURCES AND PARKS WASTEWATER TREATMENT DIVISION. 9 Respondents. 10 11 This matter comes before the Pollution Control Hearings Board (Board) on a Motion for 12 13 Summary Judgment filed by Respondent King County Department of Natural Resources and 14 Parks Wastewater Treatment Division (County). Appellants are challenging two NPDES permits 15 issued by the Washington State Department of Ecology (Ecology) for discharge of water during 16 the construction of a wastewater treatment plant and its associated conveyance lines. The County is asking the Board to uphold the permits and dismiss these appeals on summary 17 judgment. 18 19 20 21 P-05-030, P-05-059 ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT

1	The Board was comprised of Chair Bill Clarke and Member William H. Lynch. ¹		
2	Administrative Appeals Judge, Kay M. Brown presided for the Board. Verna P. Bromley, King		
3	County Prosecuting Attorney and Gillis Reavis, Foster Pepper & Shefelman, represented King		
4	County. Joan M. Marchioro, Senior Assistant Attorney General, represented Ecology.		
5	Appellants Emma Dixon and Gerald Farris represented themselves. Charles Blaine, member,		
6	represented Sno-King Environmental Alliance (SKEA).		
7	In rendering its decision, the Board considered the following submittals:		
8	1.	King County's Motion for Summary Judgment, Declaration of Chris Tiffany with attached Exhibits A and B, Declaration of Gillis Reavis with attached Exhibits A through C, and copies of federal case cited by King County;	
10	2.	King County's Erratum Regarding Title of Declaration;	
	3.	Ecology's Response to King County's Motion for Summary Judgment;	
11 12	4.	Appellants' Response to King County's Motion for Summary Judgment, Declaration of Emma J. Dixon with attached Exhibits A through V, and Declaration of James Macrae; and	
13	5.	King County's Reply to Appellants' Response.	
14	In addition to the submittals listed above, the Board also considered the material		
15	submitted by both parties related to the prior motion for a stay filed by Appellants. This materia		
16	includes:		
17	6.	Appellants' Notice of Appeal;	
18 19	7.	Appellants' Motion for an Order to Stay Department of Ecology's Permits, Declaration of Emma Dixon and attached exhibits 1-10;	
20			
21	¹ The third position on the Board is currently vacant.		
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1	8.	Ecology's Response to Appellants' Motion for an Order to Stay and Declaration of Mark Henley;
2	0	Vine County's Designed to Appellants' Mation for Story Declaration of Bath
3	9.	King County's Response to Appellants' Motion for Stay, Declaration of Beth Peterson, Declaration of Christie True, and Declaration of Gillis E. Reavis and attached exhibits A-H; and,
4	10.	Appellants' Reply in Support of Motion to Stay Permits
5	10.	Appenants Reply in Support of Motion to Stay Fernits
6	Having fully considered the record in this case and being fully advised, the Board enters	
7	the following ruling.	
8		FACTUAL BACKGROUND
9	King County has proposed construction of a wastewater treatment plant, called	
10	Brightwater, in unincorporated Snohomish County. If constructed, this project will consist of a	
11	wastewater treatment plant, conveyance system, and marine outfall. (Henley Decl, p. 2). The	
12	treatment plant will be located on a portion of an approximately 114-acre site, selected by the	
13	County, east of State Route 9 (SR-9), northeast of the intersection of SR-9 and SR-522 north of	
14	Woodinville. It will treat and disinfect up to 36 million gallons per day of wastewater from King	
15	County's Nor	th King and South Snohomish service areas. The conveyance system will transport
16	untreated was	tewater (influent) to the plant and treated wastewater (effluent) from the plant to an
17	outfall in Puge	et Sound. (Reavis Decl., Exs. A and B).
18	King (County completed a final environmental impact statement ("FEIS") on the project
19	on November	19, 2003. (Reavis Decl., Ex. G). On January 20, 2004, SKEA appealed to King
20	County, arguin	ng that the FEIS was inadequate because it failed to identify and evaluate an

adequate number of alternatives to the preferred proposal, and that there was insufficient discussion of the probable adverse impacts of the proposal regarding the potential impact of seismic events. On August 3, 2004, King County Hearing Examiner *pro tem* James N. O'Connor denied SKEA's appeal as it related to site selection. He found that the FEIS provided "a reasonably adequate analysis of possible damage to the influent and effluent pipelines from seismic events, including pipeline rupture that might occur from movement of earthquake faults that are necessarily crossed by the pipelines." (Dixon Decl., Ex. 1, p. 12).

However, he found that the FEIS provided insufficient information and analysis concerning suspected fault lines under the treatment plant site itself. He noted that "[t]he opening and inspection of a trench is the method now generally accepted by earthquake geologists to ascertain the presence or absence of a fault in a suspected area...." Such information, he said, was essential "as the basis for a reasonable discussion and analysis" of potential seismic impacts, and without that additional information, "the November 19, 2003, FEIS is not adequate for future government actions that will determine the location of wastewater treatment facilities on the Route 9 site or provide the permits that are required for the construction of improvements to the site." Id. (italics added). Examiner O'Connor therefore denied SKEA's appeal and found the FEIS adequate as of its date of issuance subject to the condition that King County excavate at least one investigative trench on or near the Route 9 site and prepare a supplemental EIS. Id. King County subsequently completed the trenching and issued a draft supplemental EIS. (Dixon Decl., Ex. 8).

SKEA appealed the Hearing Examiner's decision to the King County Superior Court, and King County filed a cross-appeal. (Reavis Decl., p. 2). On June 17, 2005, King County Superior Court Judge Theresa B. Doyle issued Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law upholding the adequacy of the FEIS and dismissing as moot King County's appeal regarding the Hearing Examiner's requirement for exploratory trenching. Judge Doyle determined that because King County had completed the trenching and had already begun preparation of a Supplemental EIS, the question of the Hearings Examiner's authority to order exploratory trenching and further analysis was moot. In re: Appeals of Adequacy of Brightwater Environmental Impact Statement Brought By Stockpot, Inc., et al., Case No. 04-2-21301-1 SEA (King County Superior Court,

The County is required to obtain two NPDES permits for the discharge of stormwater related to construction activity. One permit covers discharge associated with construction of the wastewater treatment plant, and one covers discharge associated with construction of the conveyance system. Ecology determined that the project did not qualify for coverage under its general stormwater construction permit, and the County filed applications for individual construction stormwater NPDES permits. It filed an application for an individual construction stormwater NPDES permit for construction of the wastewater treatment facility on April 6, 2004, and for construction of the conveyance system on June 3, 2004. (Henley Decl., p. 2).

Ecology subsequently prepared draft individual permits for both applications and made them available for public comment. In preparing these permits, Ecology reviewed the water

June 17, 2005).

quality sections of the FEIS, deemed them adequate for purposes of permitting, and used them in crafting the NPDES permits. (Henley Decl., p. 2). Ecology issued the individual construction stormwater permit for the conveyance system on January 31, 2005, and for the wastewater treatment plant on March 17, 2005. (Reavis Decl., Exs. A and B).

PROCEDURE AT THE PCHB

Appellants Emma Dixon, Gerald Farris, and SKEA appealed Ecology's approval of the

Appellants Emma Dixon, Gerald Farris, and SKEA appealed Ecology's approval of the NPDES permits to this Board. They also filed a motion for a stay of the permits. In their motion, Appellants argued that they were likely to prevail on two of the many issues identified in the appeal. The two issues argued in the stay motion were:

- a) Whether the Department of Ecology violated a King County Hearing Examiner's [August 3, 2004] ruling prohibiting any permits or government actions relating to construction until a Final Supplemental EIS has been issued.
- b) Whether King County failed to obtain a valid NPDES permit by neglecting to identify both the conveyance portal located on the treatment plant site and its receiving waters prior to applying for a grading permit with Snohomish County for this location

Following submittals by the County and Ecology in response to the motion, and the filing of a

reply by Appellants, the Board issued an order denying the motion for a stay. Dixon et.al. v.

Ecology et. al., PCHB No. 05-030, 05-059 (Denial of Motion for Stay)(June 15,

2005)(hereinafter referred to as "Order Denying Stay"). In its Order Denying Stay, the Board

concluded Appellants were unlikely to prevail on either of the two issues argued in the stay

motion, and that Appellants had failed to demonstrate irreparable harm.

a a b c d d e f f g h i)	 Potential cumulative impacts of increased impervious surfaces; Potential release of raw sewage in case of catastrophic failure; Lack of supplemental DEIS; Identification of a conveyance portal at the treatment plant site²; Adequacy of public hearings, analytical methodologies, and consideration of public comments; and Analysis of need for the Brightwater system. Whether the Board has jurisdiction over King County's alleged failure to omply with SEPA, specifically with regard to the following:
a a b c d d e f f g h i)	pplicable laws and regulations in its consideration of the following: Potential seismic faults; Potential dewatering discharges; Potential loss of water supply; Potential cumulative impacts of increased impervious surfaces; Potential release of raw sewage in case of catastrophic failure; Lack of supplemental DEIS; Identification of a conveyance portal at the treatment plant site ² ; Adequacy of public hearings, analytical methodologies, and consideration of public comments; and Analysis of need for the Brightwater system. Whether the Board has jurisdiction over King County's alleged failure to omply with SEPA, specifically with regard to the following: Whether, in the context of an appeal of this NPDES construction stormwater permit, the appellants may appeal post-construction issues tha
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C	omply with SEPA, specifically with regard to the following: Whether, in the context of an appeal of this NPDES construction stormwater permit, the appellants may appeal post-construction issues that
a)	stormwater permit, the appellants may appeal post-construction issues tha
b	Whether the potential loss of water supply falls within the jurisdictional scope of an NPDES stormwater permit appeal;
c) Whether the Board has jurisdiction to in the context of this NPDES construction permit appeal to decide issues related to King County's
	decision not to issue a supplemental draft EIS on the Brightwater project prior to issuance of the Final EIS in November 2003, and
d	Whether the need for the Brightwater Project is properly within the scope of this NPDES construction stormwater permit appeal; and
1	d have a

e) Whether Ecology and the County failed to abide with the August 3, 2004, decision of Hearing Examiner James O'Connor on the adequacy of the Brightwater FEIS.³

ANALYSIS

A. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is a procedure available to avoid unnecessary trials on formal issues that cannot be factually supported and could not lead to, or result in, a favorable outcome to the opposing party. *Jacobsen v. State*, 89 Wn. 2d 104, 108, 569 P.2d 1152, 1155 (1977). The party moving for summary judgment must show there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. *Magula v. Benton Franklin Title Co.*, *Inc.*, 131 Wn. 2d 171, 182; 930 P. 2d 307, 313 (1997). A material fact in a summary judgment proceeding is one affecting the outcome under the governing law. *Eriks v. Denver*, 118 Wn.2d 451, 456, 824 P. 2d 1207, 1210 (1992). The trier of fact must construe the evidence and consider the material facts and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. *Weatherbee v. Gustafson*, 64 Wn. App. 128, 131, 822 P. 2d 1257 (1992). If the moving party is a respondent and meets this initial showing, then the inquiry shifts to the party with the burden of proof at trial. If, at this point, the non-moving party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on

³ This decision does not address issues 2 (a) through (d) separately, because the issues are subsumed by issues 1 (a) though (i), and the discussions pertaining thereto. Issue 2(e)(whether Ecology and the County failed to abide by the Hearing Eaminer's decision) was the subject of detailed analysis in the stay order. The Board concluded King County and Ecology were likely to prevail on this issue. King County now seeks summary judgment on this issue based on the prior holding in the stay order. Although the stay order is not binding precedent on this issue, it does reflect the analysis of the Board based on the information it had at the time of the stay. Appellants have made only limited additional argument on this issue, which is addressed in Section B of this decision.

which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial, then the trial court should grant the motion.

Young v. Key Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 112 Wn. 2d 216, 225, 770 P.2d 182, 187(1989).

Here, the Board concludes that there are no contested issues of material fact, and therefore this matter can be decided on summary judgment.

B. Seismic Activity (Issues 1 (a) and (e)) and 2(e)

Appellants have challenged the NPDES permits for their alleged failure to adequately address the risks from seismic activity.⁴ This issue is closely tied to Appellants' argument that the NPDES permits should not have been approved until completion of the supplemental EIS, and that by approving the permits Ecology violated the King County Hearing Examiner's decision. Both of these issues were analyzed extensively in the Board's order denying the stay motion. *See* Order Denying Stay, pp. 5-9. Although this analysis was done in the context of determining the Appellants' likelihood of prevailing on the merits of the issue at hearing, absent new arguments or new factual material related to the issue, the analysis is still applicable.

Appellants, in their response to the summary judgment motion, do offer more factual support for their contentions regarding seismic risks than they did on the motion for a stay. *See* Dixon Decl. in Response to Summary Judgment, Exhibits C through G. However, this factual material does not strengthen the connection between the risks posed by seismic activity and the

⁴With regard to the potential for release of raw sewage during a seismic event (issue 1(e)), the Board concludes that this is a post-construction issue that is beyond the scope of this appeal. Raw sewage will not be present at the plant or in the conveyance system until the plant is operational. Therefore, this issue is not relevant to a review of the NPDES permits approved for discharges <u>during construction</u>.

1	matters regulated by Ecology in its approval of NPDES permits for discharges of stormwater		
2	during construction. As the Board stated in its Order Denying Stay:		
3	Ecology's NPDES permits establish conditions relating to the control, treatment, and discharge of stormwater generated during the construction of the wastewater treatment		
4	plant and conveyance system. The water quality effluent limits and best management practices required in the permits would apply to the treatment plant located on the Route		
5	9 site regardless of where or how the plant is configured on the site		
6	Order Denying Stay, p. 6. The Board went on to quote the fact sheet accompanying Permit WA-003204-2:		
7	The construction stormwater NPDES permits are water quality permits that regulate the		
8	stormwater runoff from a construction site and the effects of dewatering waters (i.e. pumped groundwater) on surface waters and groundwaters. The permits bear no relation		
9	to the types and locations of permanent structures on the Route 9 site nor do they describe the locations of temporary, construction stormwater settling ponds used for treatment.		
10	The construction stormwater permits set conditions to ensure that stormwater runoff and dewatering waters from the construction site does not cause harm to Little Bear Creek or		
11	underlying groundwaters. The terms and conditions of the permits apply to the term of the construction phase only and are applicable whether or not a fault exists and whether		
12	or not a fault is active or an event occurs.		
13	The Board concluded that:		
14	Because the SEIS would not in any way change the basis for the conditions in the NPDES permits, there is no practical reason for enjoining Ecology from issuing them.		
15			
16	See Order Denying Stay, p. 6. Nothing in Appellants' response to the summary judgment		
17	persuades the Board that this conclusion is incorrect.		
18	Appellants also argue that Ecology should not have relied on the Brightwater FEIS		
19	because it was inadequate. They contend that because the conclusions in the FEIS and its		
20	accompanying technical memorandum lack a stamp of a licensed geologist, the conclusions are		
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1	not reliable. They contrast this material with additional evidence that they offer from Dr. Yeats
2	that offers technical geological criticism of the FEIS, and is supported by his professional
3	geological stamp. (Dixon Decl. in Response to Summary Judgment, Ex. C). Here again, the
4	information being challenged in the FEIS goes to seismic activity, and not water quality. This
5	information is not relevant to Ecology's decision to approve the NPDES permits for discharges
6	during construction. Further, the adequacy of the FEIS was already challenged by the Appellants
7	in another forum, and upheld. Ecology was entitled to review and rely on the completed final
8	Brightwater EIS when approving the NPDES permits. It was not required to wait for completion
9	of a supplemental EIS addressing the risk of seismic activity at the proposed site of the treatment
10	facility when such information was not relevant to the approval of the NPDES permits.

Appellants' next argument against summary judgment on this issue goes to Ecology's compliance with WAC 197-11-070. This rule states:

- (1) Until the responsible official issues a final determination of nonsignificance or final environmental impact statement, no action concerning the proposal shall be taken by a governmental agency that would:
- (a) Have an adverse environmental impact; or
- (b) Limit the choice of reasonable alternatives.

Appellants argue that Ecology's approval of the NPDES permits prior to completion of the supplemental EIS violates this rule. However, as the Board opined in its Order Denying Stay:

WAC 197-11-070(1) prohibits an agency from taking certain actions that could have an adverse environmental impact or limit the choice of reasonable alternatives only "[u]ntil the responsible official issues a final determination of non-significance or final environmental impact statement." Here, King County issued a final EIS in November

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2003, which the hearing Examiner and Superior Court upheld. When Ecology reviewed the FEIS and determined that it was sufficient for purposes of the NPDES permits, it satisfied its obligations under WAC 197-11-070.

See Order Denying Stay, p. 8. Appellants offer no new evidence or arguments that would change the Board's conclusion on this point.

Appellants' final argument against summary judgment on these issues is that Ecology was required by the Hearing Examiner's Order to wait until the SEIS was completed before issuing the NPDES permits. As already stated, this issue was extensively analyzed in the order denying the motion for stay. See Order Denying Stay, pp. 5-8. However, Appellants make a new argument related to this issue. They contend that King County inappropriately influenced Ecology by sending a letter to Ecology's legal counsel from their legal counsel analyzing the effect of the Hearing Examiner's Decision on Ecology's authority to proceed with issuance of the NPDES permits for construction discharges. See Dixon Decl. in Response to Summary Judgment, Ex. J. In this memorandum, King County set forth their arguments in support of Ecology's authority to proceed without issuance of the Supplemental EIS. The fact that King County attempted to persuade Ecology to proceed with issuance of the permits is not relevant to the correctness of Ecology's decision to do so. The correctness of Ecology's actions was already evaluated by the Board in the Order Denying Stay. No additional arguments have been presented that in the response to summary judgment that change this analysis.

The Board concludes that Respondents are entitled to summary judgment on Issues 1(a) and (e), and 2(e).

C. Dewatering (Issues (1)(b) and (c))

Appellants' arguments, as presented in their response to the summary judgment on these issues, are two fold. First, appellants contend that the turbidity in future discharges will violate the NPDES permit limits. Second, they argue that the volume of water being withdrawn is an issue because it is not all being put back into the Lake Washington drainage, and therefore the reduction of available water could impact the potential beneficial use of groundwater by residents in violation of WAC 173-216-110(1)(d).

Appellants' first argument is an enforcement issue that is beyond the scope of this board's jurisdiction. *Ortman, et. al. v. Department of Ecology, et.al,* PCHB No. 99-115 and 116 (Order Granting Summary Judgment and Dismissal)(February 15, 2000)(holding PCHB lacks jurisdiction over enforcement issues); RCW 43.21B.110. If in the future, discharges occur that violate the permit, Ecology is the agency charged with taking action to enforce the permit. If Ecology's action is appealed to this Board, the Board will then have jurisdiction to review Ecology's action. Until that point, however, the Board does not have jurisdiction over enforcement actions.

Appellants' second argument goes to <u>availability</u> of water left behind after dewatering to facilitate construction, not the <u>quality</u> of the water discharged during construction activities. The availability of water, as opposed to water quality, is a water rights issue beyond the scope of an NPDES permit appeal. *See Cascade Gateway Foundation et. al. v. Ecology et. al.*, PCHB No.

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02-095 (Order Denying Motion for Partial Summary Judgment)(Feb. 24, 2003) p.7, n. 4 (Order Granting Motions in Limine)(March 10, 2003).

Appellant cites WAC 173-216-110 for support for its position that Ecology must consider the effect on beneficial uses of groundwater when approving an NPDES permit. WAC 173-216-110, a rule pertaining to the state waste discharge program states:

- 1) Any permit issued by the department shall specify conditions necessary to prevent and control waste discharges into the waters of the state, including the following, whenever applicable:
 - d) Any conditions necessary to meet applicable water quality standards for surface vaters or to preserve or protect beneficial uses for ground waters;

It is true that the rule requires Ecology to consider the effect on beneficial uses of groundwater, but only from "discharges." Here, Appellants' concerns regarding dewatering do not stem from a discharge into water, but from a withdrawal of water. This issue is not covered by the NPDES permit.

The Board concludes that the dewatering issues are beyond the scope of this appeal, and grants summary judgment to King County on issues (1)(b) and (c).

D. Impervious Surfaces (Issue 1(d))

King County argues that Appellants' issue pertaining to impervious surfaces should be dismissed because it is beyond the scope of an appeal of NPDES permits issued for discharges during construction activities. A review of Appellants' argument on this issue confirms the correctness of King County's position.

P-05-030, P-05-059 ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT Appellants argue that King County can't make claims regarding the size, ratio, or impacts of impervious surfaces without a final design in place for the Brightwater treatment facility.

They point to changes in the plans related to the size of the buildings, spaces between buildings, creeks and pond configurations, and the design of the stormwater canal. Clearly these are "post construction" issues pertaining to run-off from impervious surfaces created as part of the facility. This type of run-off is not relevant to the discharges during construction regulated by these NPDES permits. The Board agrees that this issue is beyond the scope of this appeal, and grants summary judgment to the Respondents on this issue.

E. Lack of Supplemental EIS (Issue 1(f))

Appellants argue that Ecology's approvals of the NPDES permits for construction discharges are flawed because Ecology relied on the County's Brightwater FEIS. Ecology had provided comments on the draft EIS document and Appellants contend the County never adequately addressed Ecology's comments in the FEIS. *See* Dixon Decl. in Response to Summary Judgment, Ex. P. Since Ecology approved the NPDES permits without waiting for issuance of the Supplemental EIS, Ecology never had an opportunity to comment on the responses the County made in the FEIS.

Here again, this argument distills down to Appellants' argument that the NPDES permits should not have been issued prior to completion of the Supplemental EIS. The Board considered

⁵ The only factual material in the record pertaining to the amount of impervious surfaces before and after construction was submitted by King County. According to this evidence, there will be fewer impervious surfaces after construction than before construction. *See* Tiffany Decl., p. 2.

and rejected this argument in Section B above. Further, as King County points out, if Ecology was dissatisfied with the County's responses to its comments on the draft EIS, it would not have issued the NPDES permits based on the FEIS. Ecology, a party in this appeal, is not propounding this argument. The Board grants King County's motion on this issue.

F. Lack of Public Hearing and Inadequate Review of Public Comments (Issue 1(h))

Appellants contend that the public process conducted by Ecology on the approval of the NPDES permits was inadequate. Specifically, they argue that Ecology should be required to address public comments and that Ecology should have conducted a public hearing on the permits.

The legal requirements for responding to public comments and conducting public hearings, are found in WAC 173-220-050 and 173-220-090. WAC 173-220-050(2) requires Ecology to retain written comments that are submitted during the comment period, and considering them in making its decision. WAC 173-220-050(5) requires Ecology to provide the persons who have commented with a response to their comments. WAC 173-220-090 requires Ecology to hold a public hearing if it determines there is a significant public interest.

Appellants, in their briefing, point to no actual violations of these rules. In fact, they admit that Ecology followed the "letter of the law." (Appellants' Response to Summary Judgment at p. 23). However, they argue Ecology did not follow the spirit of the law because they did not facilitate opportunity for the public to comment on the "project." This misconstrues the nature of Ecology's responsibilities in approving the NPDES permits for discharges during

1	construction. As is evident from the bulk of the issues raised in this appeal, Appellants' concerns	
2	are primarily with the overall project, not the NPDES permits for discharges during construction.	
3	These project concerns are beyond the scope of this appeal.	
4	G. Need for Brightwater System (Issue 1(i))	
5	Appellants contend that the Brightwater System is not needed. Even if this were true, it	
6	is clearly beyond the scope of the appeal on the NPDES permit. Therefore, the Board grants	
7	summary judgment on this issue.	
8	Based on the foregoing analysis, the Board enters the following	
9	<u>ORDER</u>	
10	King County's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted on all issues, and this appeal is	
11	dismissed.	
12	DATED this 21 st day of October 2005.	
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14	POLLUTION CONTROL HEARINGS BOARD	
15	BILL CLARKE, Chair	
16	WILLIAM H. LYNCH, Member	
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18	Kay M. Brown, Administrative Appeals Judge, Presiding	
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